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Abstract
The amount of confidential information ac-
cessible through the Internet is growing con-
tinuously. In this scenario, the improvement
of anonymizing methods becomes crucial to
avoid revealing sensible information of indi-
viduals. Among several protection methods
proposed, those based on the use of linear re-
gressions are widely utilized. However, there
is not a reason to assume that linear regres-
sion is better than using more complex poly-
nomial regressions. In this paper, we present
PoROP-k, a family of anonymizing methods
able to protect a data set using polynomial re-
gressions. We show that PoROP-k not only
reduces the loss of information, but it also
obtains a better level of protection compared
to previous proposals based on linear regres-
sions.
1 Introduction
Privacy in statistical databases (PSD) [14] and
privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) [2]
studies the tension between the increasing so-
cietal and economical demand for accurate in-
formation, and the legal and ethical obliga-
tion to protect the privacy of individuals and
enterprisers which are the respondents of the
statistical data.
Since the use of the Internet has become
very usual in all business areas, privacy is a
common concern for all those companies which
have sensible data accessible through the web.
Also, surveys show that most of the web users
are unwilling to provide confidential data into
a web site unless privacy protection measures
are provided [3].
For this reason, a wide range of anonymiz-
ing methods have been proposed. The goal
of these methods is to ensure an acceptable
level of protection of the confidential data pre-
serving their statistical utility. Good surveys
about protection methods can be found in the
literature [1, 9].
In [9], the anonymizing methods are classi-
fied into two different categories depending on
their use of the original values: synthetic data
generators and perturvative protection meth-
ods. The synthetic data generators only use
original data to build a model and, after-
wards, a new data set is built based on this
model. The perturbative protection methods
are based in the addition of noise into the orig-
inal data set in order to make it difficult for
an intruder to recover the original values.
Linear regression models are commonly used
to anonymize data. Two examples of this
kind are the Information Preserving Statisti-
cal Obfuscation (IPSO) [5], a synthetic data
generator, and LiROP-k methods [11], which
include both a set of perturvative protection
method and a set of synthetic data genera-
tors, and were developed to solve some draw-
backs of IPSO [13]. However, to our knowl-
edge, more complex regression methods have
not been presented in the literature.
In this paper, we study a new family of
methods called PoROP-k, that makes it pos-
sible to protect confidential data using more
complex regression models. We show in our
experiments that incrementing the complex-
ity of the regression model, PoROP-k meth-
ods outperform LiROP-k methods (which are
a particular case of the family of methods in-
cluded in PoROP-k), when the score, a stan-
dard measure to compare protection methods
defined in [8], is used to compare both meth-
ods.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In
Section 2, we present the scenario of our work,
in Section 3, we present our protection method
using polynomial regression. Then, in Sec-
tion 4 we describe the experiments. Finally,
the paper draws some conclusions and a de-
scription of future work.
2 Privacy Protection Scenario
Before presenting our proposal, we first
present the protection scenario assumed in this
work.
The main objective of a protection method
is to anonymize a data set. A data set can be
viewed as a file containing a number of records,
where each record contains a set of attributes
of an individual. The attributes in the origi-
nal data set can be classified into two differ-
ent categories, depending on their capability
to identify unique individuals, as follows:
• Identifiers. The identifier attributes are
used to identify the individual unambigu-
ously. A typical example of identifier is
the passport number.
• Quasi-identifiers. A quasi-identifier at-
tribute is an attribute that is not able to
identify a single individual when it is used
alone. However, when it is combined with
other quasi-identifier attributes, they can
uniquely identify an individual. Among
the quasi-identifier attributes, we dis-
tinguish between confidential and non-
confidential, depending on whether they
contain confidential information. An ex-
ample of non-confidential quasi-identifier
attribute would be the postal code, while
a confidential quasi-identifier might be
the salary.
When a data set is protected, identifiers
are removed or encrypted to prevent an in-
truder to re-identify individuals easily. Typ-
ically, the remaining attributes are released,
some of them protected. In this paper, we as-
sume that non-confidential attributes are pro-
tected, while confidential attributes are not.
This allows third parties to have precise infor-
mation on confidential data without revealing
to whom that confidential data belongs to.
In this scenario, as shown in Figure 1, an in-
truder might try to re-identify individuals by
obtaining the non-confidential quasi-identifier
data (Y ) together with identifiers (Id) from
other data sources. Applying record link-
age between the protected attributes (Y ′) and
the same attributes obtained from other data
sources (Y ), the intruder might be able to re-
identify a percentage of the protected individ-
uals together with their confidential data (X).
This is what protection methods try to pre-
vent.
3 Method description
Analogously to LiROP-k methods, polynomial
regression on Ordered Partitions (PoROP-k)
methods pre-process the original data using
three basics steps: vectorization, sorting and
partitioning. There are several aspects that
motivate these three steps:
Vectorization. The main idea of this first
step is to gather all the values in the
data set in a single vector, independently
of the attribute they belong to. Conse-
quently, we are ignoring the attribute se-
mantics and, therefore, all the possible re-
lationships, like covariance or correlations
among the attributes in the data set.
Figure 1: Re-identification scenario.
Sorting. The second step is to sort all the
vectorized values. This step is necessary
in order to fit the data into a model in a
easy way. Note that sorting the values is
a way of adding noise.
Partitioning. Even taking into account that
data is sorted, using a unique model to fit
all the data is unfeasible because the error
of the model could be very large. In or-
der to improve the accuracy, the sorted
vectorized data is split into several k-
partitions. Then a different model regres-
sion is used to fit the data of each parti-
tion. Modifying the value of k, PoROP-k
methods allow us to tune the accuracy of
the regression model by changing the size
of the partition being fitted. Note that if
the data set was not sorted, k would not
have this property.
Since the range of the values in the differ-
ent attributes could differ significantly among
them, it might happen that the sorting step
does not merge all the attributes appropri-
ately. For this reason, it is necessary to nor-
malize the data. There are many ways to nor-
malize a data set. A possible solution would be
to normalize each attribute independently be-
fore the application of the vectorization step.
This normalization method could present
problems with skewed attributes and, there-
fore, the attributes could not be merged in
the sorting step. For this reason, we propose
to normalize the data stored in each partition
independently. This way, similar values are
put in the same partition and, therefore, the
chances to avoid the effect of skewness in the
data is higher. Once the data is normalized,
vectorization, sorting and partitioning steps
are repeated.
Formally speaking, let D be the original
data set to be protected. We denote by R the
number of records in D. Each record consists
of a numerical attributes or fields. We assume
that none of the registers contain blanks. We
denote by N the total number of values in D.
As a consequence, N = R · a.
Let V be a vector of size N . First, V is
sorted increasingly. Let us denote by Vs the
ordered vector of size N containing the sorted
data and vi the ith element of vector Vs, where
0 ≤ i < N .
Next, Vs is divided into smaller sub-vectors
or partitions. Then, each sub-vector is nor-
malized into the [0, 1] interval and they are
all sorted and partitioned again. We define k,
where 1 < k ≤ N , as the number of values
per partition. Note that, if k is not a divisor
of N the last partition will contain a smaller
number of values. Let P be the number of k-
partitions. We call r the number of values in
the last partition where 0 ≤ r < k. Therefore,
N = kP+r. If r > 0, we have P+1 partitions.
We denote by Pm the mth partition.
Linear regression Quadratic regression Cubic regression
Figure 2: An example of a set of points from a partition, its model regression and the more probable
interval for the protected value when noise is added independently.
Linear regression Quadratic regression Cubic regression
Figure 3: An example of a set of points from a partition, its model regression and the more probable
interval for the protected value when noise is added taking into account the original value.
Let vm,n be defined as the nth element of
Pm:{
vm,n := vmk+n n = 0 . . . k − 1 m = 0 . . . P − 1
vP,n := vPk+n n = 0 . . . r − 1
For each Pm, a regression model is com-
puted over the following (X, Y ) points:
(0 , vm,0) (1 , vm,1) · · · (k − 1 , vm,(k−1))
When r > 0, the size of the last parti-
tion (PP ) is r < k. In this case, the regres-
sion model of this partition is computed dif-
ferently: the nearest last k points of the data
set are used to compute the regression model,
but only the r points held by PP are actually
protected. This guarantees that each regres-
sion model is computed using the same num-
ber of points, so the level of accuracy is homo-
geneous. Therefore, in this case, the fitting for
the last partition is computed over the follow-
ing (X, Y ) points:
(0 , vm,N−k) (1 , vm,N−k+1) · · · (k−1 , vm,N−1)
Finally, when the regression model is com-
puted, PoROP-k methods add Gaussian noise
to the polynomial regression to partially
change the order of the points. With the ad-
dition of noise, it will be more difficult for an
intruder to reveal the original data even know-
ing the values of some attributes.
Similarly to LiROP-k methods, PoROP-k
methods can be considered both a protection
method and a synthetic data generator de-
pending on the way used to add noise. If the
Gaussian noise is computed independently of
the original value to protect, PoROP-k meth-
ods can be considered synthetic data genera-
tors. We call this configuration PoROPs-k and
is described in Figure 2. On the other hand,
if the noise addition is dependent on the point
to be protected, PoROP-k methods must be
considered perturbative. In this latter case,
we call this configuration PoROPp-k. An ex-
ample of these is presented in Figure 3. More
details about noise addition methods based on
linear regression models can be found in [11].
Following, we present the formulas to com-
pute PoROP-k methods using linear and
quadratic regressions. Formulas for cubic re-
gressions, although they are used later in the
experiments, are omitted in this paper due
their length and complexity.
3.1 PoROP-k using linear regression
When a linear regression is used to model the
data in each partition, PoROP-k methods be-
come LiROP-k methods, since these last sub-
set is a particular case of our proposal. Assum-
ing that the resulting linear regression which
models the data is lm,n = αmn + βm (where
n = 0 . . . k − 1), then the expressions used to
compute αm and βm are as follows:
αm =
2
k(k + 1)
[
(2k − 1)
k−1∑
n=0
vm,n − 3
k−1∑
n=1
n vm,n
]
βm =
2
k(k + 1)
[
−3
k−1∑
n=0
vm,n +
6
k − 1
k−1∑
n=1
n vm,n
]
These results can be derived from the normal
equations as presented in [6].
3.2 PoROP-k using quadratic regression
However, as mentioned previously, PoROP-k
methods allow to use more complex models. In
this subsection we present the equations used
to build a quadratic model, assuming that
the resulting quadratic regression is lm,n =
αmn
2 + βmn + γm (where n = 0 . . . k − 1).
Specifically, the expressions used to compute
αm, βm and γm are presented in Figure 4.
Analogously to the linear regression, these re-
sults can be derived from the normal equa-
tions.
4 Experiments
In Section 3, we have presented the PoROP-k
protection methods, which protect a data set
combining a new vision of the data to be pro-
tected with a complex pre-processing process
and a model regression. In this section, we
describe a set of experiments that allow us to
test the new set of methods presented in this
paper and compare them to the more simple
linear models.
4.1 Data
For evaluation purposes, we have considered
the two reference data sets proposed in the
CASC project [4]. The first has been extracted
using the Data Extraction System (DES) from
the U. S. Census Bureau [7], called Cen-
sus. The second has been obtained from the
U.S. Energy Information Authority [10], called
EIA.
The Census data set contains 1080 records
consisting of 13 attributes (which is equal to
14040 values to be protected). The EIA data
set, after removing the identifiers and the cat-
egorical attributes, contains 4092 records con-
sisting of 5 attributes. The total number of
values to be protected in this data set is equal
to 20460.
4.2 Measures
In order to evaluate PoROP-k methods we
calculate the score, a typical general measure
used to compare different protection meth-
ods [9]. We have used this score to com-
pare PoROP-k methods with LiROP-k meth-
ods.
In order to calculate the score, we use the
measures presented in previous work:
• Information Loss (IL): Let X and X ′
be matrices representing the original and
the protected data set, respectively. Let
V and R be the covariance matrix and the
correlation matrix of X, respectively; let
X be the vector of variable averages for X
and let S be the diagonal of V . Define V ′,
R′,X
′
, and S′ analogously from X ′. The
information loss is computed by averag-
ing the mean variations of X − X ′,V −
V ′,S − S′, and the mean absolute error
of R − R′ and multiplying the resulting
average by 100. All these measures have
been extracted from [9] and are computed
in the same way.
• Disclosure Risk (DR): We use the
three different methods presented in [12]
in order to evaluate DR: (i) Distance
Linkage Disclosure risk (DLD), which is
the average percentage of linked records
αm = 3
(
3N2 − 3N + 2
)∑N−1
k=0
pk
N (N2 + 3N + 2)
− 18 (2N − 1)
∑N−1
k=0
kpk
N (N2 + 3N + 2)
+ 30
∑N−1
k=0
k2pk
N (N2 + 3N + 2)
βm = −18
(2N − 1)
∑N−1
k=0
pk
N (N2 + 3N + 2)
+ 12
(
16N2 − 30N + 11
)∑N−1
k=0
kpk
N (N4 − 5N2 + 4) − 180
∑N−1
k=0
k2pk
N (N3 +N2 − 4N − 4)
γm = 30
∑N−1
k=0
pk
N (N2 + 3N + 2)
− 180
∑N−1
k=0
kpk
N (N3 +N2 − 4N − 4) + 180
∑N−1
k=0
k2pk
N (N4 − 5N2 + 4)
Figure 4: Equations to model a data set using linear regression.
using distance based record linkage,
(ii) Probabilistic Linkage Disclosure risk
(PLD), which is the average percentage
of linked records using probabilistic based
record linkage and (iii) Interval Disclosure
risk (ID) which is the average percentage
of original values falling into the inter-
vals around their corresponding masked
values. The three values are computed
over the number of attributes that the in-
truder is assumed to know that, in our
case, ranges from one to half of the at-
tributes. These measures have been ex-
tracted from [9] and are computed in the
same way:
DR = 0.25DLD + 0.25PLD + 0.5 ID
• Score: A final score measure is computed
by weighting the presented measures, also
proposed in [9]:
score = 0.5 IL+ 0.5DR
4.3 Results
In order to understand whether using more
complex regression methods allows us to pre-
serve the information more accurately, we first
study the information loss of each method.
We test PoROPs-k and PoROPp-k methods
using linear, quadratic and cubic regressions.
The range of values for the number of points
per partition k has been defined in order to
Census
k Linear Quadratic Cubic
2000 0.3 0.1 0.1
5000 3.9 0.9 0.6
6000 16.2 1.9 1.7
7000 42.3 12.1 3.4
10000 99.3 33.9 24.1
Table 1: Average result of IL for the PoROPp-
k methods using the Census data set.
EIA
k Linear Quadratic Cubic
6000 17.9 15.4 14.5
10000 25.9 18.1 17.4
11000 64.8 23.6 17.6
12000 56.0 26.7 21.9
180000 119.7 52.0 33.3
Table 2: Average result of IL for the PoROPp-
k methods using the EIA data set.
make the IL range between 0 to 100. For this
reason, k values are different in each data set.
We have executed each configuration ten
times performing 200 tests in total. The av-
erage IL for each configuration is presented in
Tables 1 and 2. Tables 3 and 4 show the av-
erage scores obtained from the experiments.
Note that the tables presented in this section
only show the results using the perturvative
version (PoROPp-k). The results obtained by
PoROPs-k are almost identical and are omit-
ted for the sake of simplicity.
In most cases, being able to control the IL
is very interesting, specially when keeping the
statistic in the protected data set is important.
As we can see in the tables, PoROP-k meth-
ods can control the IL by modifying parameter
k. Usually, when parameter k increases, IL in-
creases. Note that this happens independently
of the model regression and the data set. In
our case, the pre-processing phase is very im-
portant to guarantee a strong correlation be-
tween k and IL, since by vectorizing, ordering,
partitioning and normalizing we make possible
to find a regression model that accurately fits
the data set.
Observing the same tables, we can see that
the more complex is the polynomial model, the
lower is the information loss. This happens
because by increasing the complexity of the
regression function, we also increase the fitting
capabilities of the complex polynomial models.
If we observe the score values shown in
Tables 3 and 4, we can see that, increas-
ing the complexity of the regression functions,
we achieve better quality in the protection.
Specifically, in the Census data set, the best
scores are obtained using quadratic regression
(32.9), while the best scores using linear re-
gressions are 39.7. Analogously, using the EIA
data set the best scores are obtained using cu-
bic regressions instead of linear regressions.
The reduction in the score values happens
since the reduction of the information loss
is larger than the increase of the disclosure
risk, compared to previous techniques based
on regression models. Note that, as we have
explained in Section 4.2 both measures are
weighted equally.
5 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have presented a generaliza-
tion of the LiROP-k anonymizing methods,
which we have called PoROP-k methods. We
have shown that, by increasing the complexity
of the regression model used to protect data,
the information loss is reduced and the over-
all quality of the protection method increases.
Census
k Linear Quadratic Cubic
2000 42.1 37.0 37.0
5000 37.7 41.1 41.6
6000 42.0 41.4 36.9
7000 39.7 32.9 35.6
10000 63.4 41.1 42.9
Table 3: Average scores for the PoROPp-k
methods using the Census data set.
EIA
k Linear Quadratic Cubic
6000 36.5 37.9 38.5
10000 32.9 33.3 33.7
11000 48.1 38.8 33.6
12000 43.3 33.1 33.9
180000 69.9 38.4 32.3
Table 4: Average scores for the PoROPp-k
methods using the EIA data set.
Also, our new class of methods allows us to
control the information loss by modifying a
parameter.
As future work, we plan to find new criteria
to decide which is the best regression model
for each partition in order to minimize the in-
formation loss preserving the disclosure risk as
low as possible.
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